

NUCLEAR FORUM

Panel: De Facto Nuclear Weapon States and the Non-proliferation Treaty Regime (Regency Room)

Date/Time: Wednesday, February 20, 2013 / 14:00-15:15

Talking Points for: Aruni Wijewardane, Diplomat-in-Residence and Adjunct

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Summary: De Facto Nuclear Weapon States and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime

The NPT deals with two categories of States – NWS and NNWS. In reality NPT Parties have to deal with a third category of States outside of the NPT, variously—called the outlier / possessor / de facto States - India Pakistan and Israel. Under different circumstances also the DPRK. Their NW programmes have very different origins, rationales and objectives and unique regional and extra regional dimensions. These states pose different sets of challenges to the NPT regime, as well as how to deal with the future.

From my own perspective (coming from a NNWS party to the NPT) how should NPT States parties—deal with the reality of de facto states while preserving the future integrity of the NPT? Can we reach a truly universal NPT?

- de facto states, which are not bound by the responsibilities of the NPT, must not be allowed to undermine the NPT regime. Costs could include denials, sanctions and isolation.
- Simultaneously induce de facto states to uphold parallel benchmarks on nonproliferation and disarmament. De facto states should not get a free-ride on the NPT.
- not explicitly and selectively "reward" these states on account of their NW possessor status NW should not bestow prestige or bargaining status. This will change the ground rules where NNWS are concerned, including in the peaceful uses "carrot" of the NPT, which is perceived as increasingly restricted to NNWS party to the NPT.
- NWS of the NPT also have a responsibility in the long term. Fulfill disarmament commitments. Rule of law and accountability in disarmament. Also other commitments made in the NPT such as steps undertaken towards the objective of creating a WMDFZ in the ME. Negative security assurances. Delegitimize NW as a bargaining tool and a symbol of prestige.

The NW option of de facto states is grounded in their broader—security reality. Solutions cannot be within the NPT alone. Accompanying comprehensive dialogue/negotiations. Situation - specific .

^{*} The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.